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Behaviour of the Far-Right in the Slovak
Parliament: Constitutional Amendment as a
PR Tool
􏁳
Simon Drugda, PhD Candidate at the University of Copenhagen
The Rule of Law crisis in Europe is correlated to the contemporary rise of populism in the
region. It is, therefore, crucial to observe the behaviour of populist actors in the position of
power and critically examine their efforts to adopt changes to the government
framework. Some such changes to the constitutional government may be aimed at the
national level: to weaken representative institutions, rig elections, pack courts, or curb
independent administrative agencies of the fourth branch. Other measures may be
directed against the EU, which is often the target of populist rhetoric. More interestingly,
proposals for constitutional change have utility even for populists out of power.
Constitutional amendments generally attract attention, and can thus be used as a
powerful tool to communicate a political message to a target audience. A comparative
study of tricks in the populist playbook may allow us to identify emergent abusive
strategies elsewhere before they are adopted domestically.
This contribution quantitatively examines the prolific drafting of constitutional
amendment proposals by the far-right Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia. The current
parliamentary term in Slovakia surpassed all previous terms on record in the number of
submitted proposals for constitutional change, and almost a third of all proposals have
been authored by the People’s Party.
Containing the Far-Right
The far-right party led by extremist Marián Kotleba entered the Slovak Parliament in
2016, carrying eight percent of the national vote. The outcome of the general election was
interpreted to indicate worrying attitudes of the ethnic majority against the Roma, and
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“growing political hostility toward potential migrants and refugees who could augment
Slovakia’s tiny Muslim population.”[1] Although the government has been purportedly
trying to stop the rise of extremism since the election, intolerance and conflict remain
prominent in the society as new clones of Kotleba’s party emerge.[2]
Benefits of Having a Seat in the Parliament
The presence of Kotleba’s party in the Parliament was a test to the Slovak liberal
democracy. The question was how to contain the extreme right? Populists, even
politicians with authoritarian tendencies have always been present in Slovak politics.
However, this was the first time that a party, which had been previously disbanded for
wanting to get rid of  democracy got elected.[3] Having a party in the Parliament brings
at least three benefits: a) MPs generally enjoy robust protection of speech;[4] b) parties
with a yield above the five percent electoral threshold receive a financial subsidy
proportionate to their share of the national vote; and c) parliamentary parties may
partake in legislation and constitution-making. All these benefits will enable populists in
different ways. This contribution only examines the last subject, looking at how Kotleba
successfully exploited the low cost of initiating constitutional change in Slovakia.
Unintended Consequences of Non-Cooperation
Kotleba promised a lot during the campaign, but upon entering the Parliament, it
became clear that almost no one wanted to cooperate with the far-right party. The
government coalition took it upon itself to stymie the rise of extremist sentiments in the
society; a claim that would not be credible if it was seen to be working with Kotleba.[5]
Most of the opposition also rejected Kotleba, which significantly decreased chances for
the People’s Party to implement its policy preferences and campaign promises, especially
the promise to break up the establishment. A constitutional change in Slovakia requires a
higher threshold for passage by the Parliament, which in turn may require some
compromise. When all other parliamentary groups principally opposed Kotleba, however,
he forswore negotiations. Since no other parliamentary group would support Kotleba’s
agenda, there were no incentives for the far-right party to comprise or moderate its
content. Instead, Kotleba focused on signalling to his electorate by invoking the most
salient power of the Parliament: the power to initiate constitutional change.
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Low Cost of Initiating a Constitutional Change
Over the duration of the parliamentary term, Kotleba’s party exploited rules on
constitution-making to initiate disruptive proposals and blame failure on the
“establishment.” The party effectively used constitution-making as a PR tool to attract
media coverage.[6] Proposals for constitutional change have been until recently rare in
Slovakia, at least when compared to a thousand legislative proposals tabled with the
Parliament per term.[7] Constitutional amendments are visible because they require a
higher threshold for adoption. Formal amendment rules in Slovakia prescribe an absolute
three-fifths majority (90 out of 150 MPs) for a constitutional change. However, the costs of
submitting constitutional proposals are much lower. MPs may initiate constitutional
change relatively easily. The only constraints on the legislative initiative, including a draft
constitutional amendment, are set by Standing Orders of the Parliament. The rules
prescribe that proposals on the same subject cannot be re-introduced within six months
after being voted down and debate on constitutional amendments must last at least 12
hours.[8] The higher threshold gives weight to proposals for constitutional change and
makes them clearly distinguishable from legislation and ordinary business of the
Parliament. Kotleba capitalised on the visibility of constitutional amendment proposals to
attract attention.
Increasing Number of Constitutional Amendment Proposals
Since taking up their seats, the 14 MPs of Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia initiated
more than 60 legislative proposals, among them a new law on the establishment of
domestic militia and a law to restrict access to legal abortion. The far-right party also
introduced 19 proposals to amend the Constitution; more than any other group in the
Parliament. Some of the constitutional amendments were duplicitous, re-submitted two
to three times after the lapse of the six-month preclusive period. None were successful.
The average vote for all 17 proposals was approximately 19 MPs pro amendment. The
highest vote was 24 and the lowest 14. Most MPs from other parties either abstained
from voting on constitutional amendments proposed by Kotleba’s party or voted against
them, which fitted the narrative that Kotleba wanted to portray.
The prolific drafting of Kotleba’s party contributed to making the 7th term of the
Parliament the one with most constitutional amendment proposals in history. MPs have
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proposed 66 constitutional amendments in the current term, and the number will likely
increase since there is still more than three months until the next general election. Figure
1 shows the rate of proposals for constitutional change in the period 1994-2019. There is a
clear tendency of MPs to propose more constitutional amendments each parliamentary
term since the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic, which may potentially
lead to instability and inflation of the normative power of the Constitution.
Conclusion
Kotleba’s MPs introduced almost a third of all proposals to change the Constitution in the
7th parliamentary term. There is not enough space to qualitatively review the proposals
in this blog contribution, but they can be roughly classified into three categories: 1)
changes that seek to enhance direct democracy at the expense of representative
institutions; 2) proposals directed against the EU; and 3) proposals on budgetary
responsibility, spending, and material resources. Instead of a conclusion, let us at least
briefly examine the most prominent proposals in each category. Out of the three,
Figure 1  The rate of constitutional amendment proposals in Slovakia since 1994. The
number of observations of proposed constitutional change for the period 1994-98 was
adapted from termly statics of the Parliament. Statistics on the constitution-making of
the Parliament for two other terms have been inaccurate, which is why all other
observations were verified by the researcher in the online database of the Parliament.
The data for the first term is not accessible through the database.
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constitutional amendments that fall in the first category seem more likely to have impact
on the Rule of Law.
Two proposals that may serve as good examples to illustrate the first category are
constitutional amendments to reduce the size of the Parliament from 150 to 100
MPs and lower the quorum of a referendum.[9] The amendment to reduce the size
of the Parliament has been already initiated three times by Kotleba’s MPs. They
calculated that the cost of 50MPs is approximately 18 mil EUR per term, and argue
that the reduction in size will unburden the state budget. A similar measure was
recently passed by lawmakers in Italy, on the initiative of the populist Five Star
Movement.[10]
Efforts to deny the primacy of EU law in Slovakia may serve as an example of a
constitutional amendment from the second category. This amendment has been
likewise already introduced three times. The amendment would delete the second
sentence of Article 7.2 from the Constitution, which reads: “The legally binding acts
of the European Communities and the European Union shall prevail over the laws of
the Slovak Republic.” Kotleba argues that the entrenchment of the principle of the
primacy of the EU law meant the complete loss of sovereignty of the Slovak
Republic.[11]
Finally, Kotleba also repeatedly tried to entrench the protection of wood as a
“strategic resource of national importance” to add it to the protection of water (Art
4.2) and land in (Art 44.5) that are both already in the Constitution. Such proposals
are popular, although they rarely lead to effective protection of natural resources on
the ground.
____________________________________
[1] Freedom in the World – Slovakia, Freedom House (2017)
[2] Intolerant attitudes have most recently found a proponent in the controversial
Supreme Court judge Štefan Harabin, who founded a party called Homeland to run in the
2020 parliamentary election. When Harabin ran for President in September 2019, he
spread disinformation about migrants and The Council of Europe Convention on
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.
[3] Kotleba’s previous party Slovak Togetherness was dissolved in 2006 by the Supreme
Court because of advocacy for the division of society into estates, in which only select few
12/5/2019 The Far-Right in the Slovak Parliament - BRIDGE Network
https://bridgenetwork.eu/2019/12/04/behaviour-of-the-far-right-in-the-slovak-parliament-constitutional-amendment-as-a-pr-tool/ 6/8
would have the right to vote. “Extremist party outlawed” (The Slovak Spectator, 6 March
2006)
[4] One of the far-right party MPs, Milan Mazurek, insulted Islam as a “satanic and
paedophile work of the devil” in the parliamentary Chamber and received a fine. Mazurek
later lost his mandate after a Supreme Court decision for comments against Roma made
outside of the Parliament. See “ĽSNS MPs got highest  ne for statements on Islam”
(The Slovak Spectator, 9 February 2019) and “Far-right MP Mazurek found guilty. He
will lose his seat” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 September 2019)
[5] 2016 Government Manifesto
[6] Kotleba’s party also poached the agenda of social-conservatives to acquire legitimacy
with the mainstream voter.
[7] The Parliament reported 1149 legislative proposals by June 2019
[8] Legislative proposals also need to have accompanying documentation, such as the
explanatory memorandum.
[9] Kotleba also proposed that the General Prosecutor should not be appointed by the
Parliament but instead appointed by the judiciary, prosecution and members of legal
professions. This constitutional amendment also proposed to introduce a popular recall
of the General Prosecutor through a referendum.
[10] “Italy reduces size of parliament ‘to save €1bn in a decade’” (BBC News, 8 October
2019)
[11] The People’s Party currently has two MEPs, after the 2019 election. See the European
Election Results by National Party: 2019-2024, Slovakia
 
The views expressed in this article reflect only the position of the author and not
necessarily the one of the BRIDGE Network Blog.
Simon Drugda, PhD Candidate at the University of Copenhagen
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